Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Campaigns and Commanders Series), by Rhys Crawley
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Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Campaigns and Commanders Series), by Rhys Crawley
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Gallipoli: the mere name summons the story of this well-known campaign of the First World War. And the story of Gallipoli, where in August 1915 the Allied forces made their last valiant effort against the Turks, is one of infamous might-have-beens. If only the Allies had held out a little longer, pushed a little harder, had better luck—Gallipoli might have been the decisive triumph that knocked the Ottoman Empire out of the First World War. But the story is just that, author Rhys Crawley tells us: a story. Not only was the outcome at Gallipoli not close, but the operation was flawed from the start, and an inevitable failure.
A painstaking effort to set the historical record straight, Climax at Gallipoli examines the performance of the Allies’ Mediterranean Expeditionary Force from the beginning of the Gallipoli Campaign to the bitter end. Crawley reminds us that in 1915, the second year of the war, the Allies were still trying to adapt to a new form of warfare, with static defense replacing the maneuver and offensive strategies of earlier British doctrine. In the attempt both the MEF at Gallipoli and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front aimed for too much—and both failed. To explain why, Crawley focuses on the operational level of war in the campaign, scrutinizing planning, command, mobility, fire support, interservice cooperation, and logistics. His work draws on unprecedented research into the files of military organizations across the United Kingdom and Australia.
The result is a view of the Gallipoli Campaign unique in its detail and scope, as well as in its conclusions—a book that looks past myth and distortion to the facts, and the truth, of what happened at this critical juncture in twentieth-century history.
Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Campaigns and Commanders Series), by Rhys Crawley- Amazon Sales Rank: #5008200 in Books
- Published on: 2015-06-24
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.00" h x .93" w x 6.00" l, 1.20 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 384 pages
Review “Rhys Crawley takes a revisionist sledgehammer to one of the remaining myths of the Gallipoli campaign: that the Allies could have won the Suvla offensive of August 1915. In a series of carefully constructed chapters he demonstrates that the operation’s failure was a function of structure rather than circumstance. Not only was the plan too ambitious, but it placed far too much faith in the possibilities of maneuver in an age of industrialized positional warfare. The result was all too typical of the Great War—an aggregation of sacrifices as futile as they were heroic.”—Dennis Showalter, author of Hitler’s Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare“Rhys Crawley’s rigorous examination of the August offensives at Gallipoli—in particular the artillery and logistic support required for a successful attack—deepens our understanding of why the First World War was so expensive in casualties, while the front lines seemed to move hardly at all. This book is highly recommended for all those interested in the Gallipoli campaign and in the operations of the First World War as a whole.”—Robert O'Neill, author of The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939
About the Author Rhys Crawley is a historian with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He received his doctorate from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy.
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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful. A thorough examination of the August Offensive at Gallipoli By Marcus Fielding The story of Australia’s part in the Gallipoli Campaign has become a central part of our national story and identity. On the eve of the campaign’s centenary it is a story that runs the risk of becoming more mythical in nature. Thank goodness, then, for Climax at Gallipoli which might put some objective balance back into the Anzac Centenary proceedings.Climax at Gallipoli examines the performance of the Allies’ Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the August Offensive of the Gallipoli Campaign. Crawley’s examination of the Campaign is rigorous, dispassionate and timely. His key message is that the August Offensive was flawed from the outset and destined to fail.Dr Rhys Crawley is a historian with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He has received several research scholarships and given talks on aspects of his research on the Gallipoli campaign at the University of Birmingham, the Imperial War Museum, the Australian War Memorial and the Istanbul Medeniyet University.Crawley reminds us that in 1915, the second year of the war, the Allies were still adapting to a new form of warfare, with static defence replacing the manoeuvre and offensive strategies of earlier British doctrine. In the attempt both the MEF at Gallipoli and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front aimed for too much and the result was all too typical of the Great War - an aggregation of sacrifices as futile as they were heroic. To explain why, he examines in detail the operational level of war in the Campaign, critically scrutinizing planning, command, mobility, fire support, inter-service cooperation, and logistics. Crawley links these elements into a military ‘system’ and his work draws on unprecedented research in the UK and Australia.Crawly is critical of the nationalistic rhetoric associated with the Gallipoli Campaign in general and the August Offensive in particular. “Gallipoli has gone down in history as something that was on the brink of succeeding,” says Crawley. “Victory was assured, the story goes, ‘if only’ the Allies had pushed a little harder, or had been the recipients of some simple good luck. “But when we take a step back, and view it as a case study in the how and why of 1915 warfare, we see a very different picture. It was not unlike what happened on the Western Front. “This was a new kind of war, and all armies were struggling to figure out how to adapt and defeat their enemy. It was years before the technology and tactics advanced to a stage where victory was possible.”The Gallipoli Campaign has also been portrayed as one in which the British foolishly sent Anzac soldiers to their death, resulting in the loss of about 8,700 Australians, and 2,700 New Zealanders. This is a popular misconception that Crawley also disputes. “Contrary to what many believe to be the case, the British officers in charge of the campaign were not bumbling fools who joyfully sent men to their death in ill-conceived plans,” he says. “Rather, they were experienced men who had an intimate knowledge of their profession. “The popular narrative forgets that the British lost many more troops at Gallipoli with around 34,000 killed throughout the campaign.”Crawley also reminds us that Gallipoli is not just a story about the Anzacs. “The Anzacs were a relatively small component of the Allied army of Indian, French, and British troops that landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Their role deserves to be part of our national narrative, as does their sacrifice,” he said. “By talking of the Anzacs at the expense of all others, we have afforded ordinary Australian volunteers, of all ages and walks of life, superman status. We have blown their actions and achievements out of all proportion, and have developed a national history of Gallipoli that is devoid of historical context.”Climax at Gallipoli is highly recommended for all those interested in the Gallipoli Campaign and in the operations of the First World War as a whole. The price may put off casual readers, but at the same time reflects the high academic standard of his research and prose. Crawley should be commended for producing an objective account of the August Offensive based on primary source material, but sadly I fear it will become more a reference book for further research than a popular bestseller.
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. A realistic appraisal of Gallipoli that cuts through the "might have beens" of its retellings.Highly recommended. By Jason M. Pilalas Much revisionist history is simply an offbeat interpretation to provoke a controversy and/or sell some books. The is the exception which shows what a dispassionate and analytical appraisal can accomplish. The author makes his points by piling his facts in a logical progression which shows the campaign, and particularly the August reinforcement and Suvla Bay landings, had very little chance of success from its outset. Like so many of the Allied offensives of World War I, especially early on, it was full of poor planning and a fundamental misappreciation of defensive firepower. Laid bare are the reasons the U.S. Marines for many years used the Gallipoli campaign as the prime example of how not to conduct amphibious warfare in the schooling that was basis for their victories in World War II.
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